
"...it's not the state or the pharmacy's fault that the PBMs have such byzantine procedures that affect drug prices." - Chief Justice Roberts during the Rutledge v PCMA argument

Improving Patient Access and Pharmacy Fairness

SB2008 - Senator David Koehler (D-Peoria)

Background: Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) are intermediary firms that manage prescription drug benefits for health insurers. In recent years, PBMs have leveraged their market power to implement abusive policies and practices that pad PBMs' profits at the direct expense of health plans, pharmacies and patients, driving many pharmacies out of business and jeopardizing patient access to essential care and creating pharmacy deserts. Those threats to access to care are even more serious in the face of the unrelenting COVID-19 pandemic.



On December 10, 2020, the Supreme Court issued an 8-0 decision in Rutledge v. PCMA.

"Most immediately, Rutledge puts PBM regulations passed by more than 45 states on much firmer footing. These laws do different things, but they are all aimed at reigning in prescription drug costs. Some ban PBM gag clauses that prevent pharmacies from telling consumers about lower-cost options. Others limit patient cost-sharing, require PBMs to disclose their price lists and manufacturer rebates to improve transparency, or prohibit so-called "spread pricing" where PBMs charge plans more than they reimburse pharmacies. Justice Sotomayor's opinion sweeps broadly enough that its reasoning is not limited to the particulars of the Arkansas law. Applying the logic of Rutledge, PBM laws are a form of health care cost regulation, and PBMs are not health plans but rather their administrative contractors, so ERISA should not preempt states' PBM regulations."

The Implications of Rutledge v. PCMA For State Health Care Cost Regulation – Health Affairs Blog, December 17, 2020

SB2008 will help correct this imbalance of power and incorporates patient access policies recently upheld by the Supreme Court 8-0 decision in *Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Association*, as well as other vital reforms. These key provisions summarized below:

- Assuring Patient Choice: Assures patient choice by requiring PBMs to accept claims from any licensed
 pharmacy that agrees to the PBM's terms and conditions. It also prohibits PBMs from charging different
 copayments. Prevents PBMs from directly or indirectly pushing patients towards their own mail order affiliates
 by restricting advertising, prohibiting mail order mandates, and prohibiting cost incentives for choosing one
 pharmacy over another.
- Allowing "Any Willing Provider" to Join PBM Networks: Assures patient choice by requiring PBMs to
 accept claims from, and admit into their networks, any licensed pharmacy that agrees to the PBM's terms and
 conditions. It also requires evenhanded treatment within networks by prohibiting PBMs from charging
 different copayments or assessing fees at some pharmacies and not others.
- Restricting Abusive Audits: Prevents audits from being conducted during times when the pharmacy will predictably be busier than normal. Restricting the number of audited prescriptions per 12-month period, and number of on-site audits per year. Prohibits auditors from being paid based on the amount recouped from pharmacies. Prohibits clerical errors being used as sole justification for recoupment.

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See *United States* v. *Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.*, 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

RUTLEDGE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARKANSAS v. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION

